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INDEMNITY - CONSTRUCTION OF INDEMNITY COVENANT. - The
plaintiff railroad company laid its tracks in a cut separating the
town of Matoaka from a group of houses now owned by the de-
fendant. These houses were formerly owned by a coal company
which had leased part of the plaintiff's right of way in order to
build steps on the embankments for the convenience of its tenants
in reaching the coal company's office and store in the town. On
one side the steps were removed leaving only a path. The other
steps, the tracks and the path constituted a private crossing. The
coal company subsequently sold the houses to the defendants, who
were required by the plaintiff to execute an encroachment lease,
the consideration for which was one dollar. The lease was in the
usual printed form containing the following indemnity clause:
"The party of the second part agrees to indemnify the Virginian
Railway Company and save it harmless from any and all claims
and costs that may arise or be made, for injury, death, loss or dam-
age resulting to the Railway Company's employees or property, or
to other persons or their property, including the lessee, or the oc-
cupants of said premises, by reason or in consequence of the occu-
pancy or the use of said premises, or the use of the property of the
Railway Company adjacent thereto." Although not an occupant
of one of the defendant's houses, X used the crossing and was in-
jured by the negligent operation of plaintiff's train. X recovered
a judgment against the plaintiff, whio brought an action of assumpsit
against the defendant on the indemnity clause. Held, that defend-
ant must indemnify plaintiff for the judgment paid to X. Cacey
v. Virginian Railway Company.-
A covenant of indemnity will not be construed to embrace
indemnification for liability incurred through the negligence of
the indemnitee unless it is so provided in clear and unequivocal
terms.2 But this does not mean that such indemnification must be
in express language.
3
So far as the language of the covenant in the principal case is
185 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
2 North American By. Construction Co. v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 172 Fed.
214, 216 (C. C. A. 7th, 1909); Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Louisville & N. R.
Co., 24 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928). By this rule it would seem if any
reasonable doubt exists as to the meaning of the covenant, it would be neces-
sary to find against plaintiff. If any ambiguity is admitted, this rule would be
further strengthened in the principal case by the general rule that a covenant
will be construed against the party drawing it. 3 WLisToN, CoxRAcTs
(1936) § 621.
3 Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 24 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A.
6th, 1928).
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concerned it would appear to the proverbial reasonable man to be
comprehensive enough to include losses sustained by the indemni-
tee because of its own negligence.4  Thus the only question is
whether the parties contemplated the making of such a compre-
hensive covenant. To determine this question the court must look
not only to the language of the covenant, but also to the subject
matter and the surrounding circumstances.5
It is pointed out in the dissenting opinion that X's injury was
not "by reason or in consequence of" the use or occupancy of the
leased premises, but that the proximate cause of the injury was the
negligence of the plaintiff in the operation of the train. It would
seem clear from the language of the covenant that it is only neces-
sary that the use or occupancy of the premises be the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's liability and not that it be the proximate
cause of the injury behind that liability. It would appear further
that plaintiff's liability was a proximate result of the use of the
premises. Had there been no crossing X's position would have
been at most that of a licensee.6 Consequently plaintiff would not
have been negligent because the only duty owing to X under those
circumstances would have been not wilfully or wantonly to injure
him -7 Thus without the use of this crossing from which plaintiff
derived no benefit and for which it received only nominal rental,
it would have been under no liability to X.
This being true, the defendant as a reasonable man should
not have expected the plaintiff to assume without indemnity the
added duty of care incident to this crossing. It is submitted, there-
fore, that the comprehensive language of this covenant was prop-
erly held to indemnify the plaintiff for the liability incurred in the
principal ease.
J. G. MCC.
4 The RESTATEMENT, CoTRAcTS (1932) § 230 provides: "IThe standard of
interpretation of an integration, except where it produces an ambiguous re-
sult, or is excluded by a rule of law establishing a definite meaning, is the
meaning that would be attached to the integration by a reasonably intelligent
person acquainted with all operative usages and knowing all the circum-
stances prior to and contemporaneous with the making of the integration, other
than oral statements by the parties of what they intended it to mean."
5 Town of Ashland v. Newman, 163 Va. 500, 175 S. E. 724, 176 S. E. 45
(1934).
eStike v. Virginian Railway Co., 114 W. Va. 832, 174 S. E. 418 (1934).
X recovered on the.theory that he was an invitee, implied from the private
crossing.
7 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) §§ 333, 340.
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